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Abstract 
As the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan continues to host the third largest Syrian 
refugee population in the world, the state’s infrastructure and its people are taking a toll. 
Before the war in Syria began, Jordan was already suffering from a weak economy, 
resource scarcity, and an enormous population boom. Since accepting nearly 2.5 million 
refugees, these issues have compounded year after year—nearly reaching a breaking 
point.   
I propose an unconventional solution to some aspects of the refugee crisis: 
renewable energy. Renewables are cheaper than fossil fuels, consume less water in 
electricity generation, emit fewer greenhouse gases, and promote job creation and 
diversification. Better yet, Jordan has enormous potential for renewable energy, 
especially in solar photovoltaics (PV) and wind.  
In this study, I evaluate Jordan’s readiness to implement renewable energy, 
analyze a case study of the Za’atari refugee camp (which recently transitioned to running 
entirely on solar energy), and make basic projections on potential job creation and water 
conservation by switching from coal and natural gas to PV and wind. I find that Jordan 
has successfully paved the way for jumpstarting its renewable sector, Za’atari has 
benefitted from solar energy, and the outlook for job creation is good, and water 
conservation even better. There are also some smaller, indirect positive impacts that 
renewable energy can have on combating the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan.   
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I. Introduction 
Before the outbreak of the war in neighboring Syria which would soon create one 
of the worst humanitarian crises in world history, Jordan was already suffering from a 
multitude of its own domestic issues. A combination of population growth, technological 
advances, and climate change has made Jordan, a once relatively water-rich state, the 
third most water-scarce country in the world.1 In addition to water scarcity, Jordan is very 
natural resource-poor and must rely on its neighbors to import over 90 percent of its 
energy.2 As in many other Arab countries, a majority of the population is under the age of 
30. Some estimates show that the under-20 population in Jordan is as high as 60 percent.3 
As youth begin to enter the workforce, the large population boom makes job competition 
extremely scarce—by 2011, the youth unemployment rate reached 14.5 percent.4 
Throughout its history, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has been the primary recipient 
of refugees in the region, hosting Palestinians since the 1940s and receiving several 
hundred thousand Iraqis during the insurgency in 2003. As a result, the demographics of 
the Kingdom have shifted substantially: Jordanian citizens are now a minority in their 
own country.  
                                                          
1 Keith Proctor, Tapped Out: Water Scarcity and Refugee Pressures in Jordan, MercyCorps, 2014, 12. 
2 “His Majesty Speeches,” Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 
http://www.memr.gov.jo/Pages/viewpage.aspx?pageID=206. 
3 J.O. Jaber, Fawwaz Elkarmi, Emil Alasis, and Anagnostopoulos Kostas, “Employment of renewable energy 
in Jordan: Current status, SWOT and problem analysis,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 49 
(2015): 491. 
4 Alexandra Francis, Jordan’s Refugee Crisis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015, 12. 
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 Inevitably, all of these issues have worsened since the massive influx of Syrian 
refugees began in 2011. As of December 2018, 671,148 Syrian refugees have registered 
with the UNHCR in Jordan.5 At the 2016 Supporting Syria & the Region conference in 
London, King Abdullah II claimed that one in every five people in Jordan is a Syrian 
refugee, 6 bringing the total to about 2 million—though his introduction to the Jordan 
Response Plan (an international aid agreement discussed in Sections II and IV) cites 2.5 
million. Though the exact number of refugees within Jordan’s borders is unclear, it is 
evident that this population boom has had a tremendous impact on Jordan’s stability by 
worsening resource scarcity and further straining state infrastructure. The GDP growth 
rate is stunted, public debt is growing rapidly, and foreign direct investment has 
plummeted.7 Citizens are feeling the effects of these changes, with unemployment 
reaching a staggering 22 percent in 2014. These economic shortcomings have 
compounded into increased resentment towards Syrians, as 96 percent of surveyed 
Jordanians felt that the refugees were to blame for the nation’s lack of job opportunities.8 
Resource scarcity has also worsened. Before the refugee crisis, Jordan’s natural 
aquifers were expected to last until 2060; now, they will likely not be functional by 
2030.9 In the northern municipalities which host the largest numbers of Syrian refugees, 
                                                          
5 “Syrian Regional Refugee Response,” UNHCR, 2018, 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36. 
6 TRT World, “King Abdullah of Jordan speaks at Syrian donor conference,” YouTube video, 6:57, 4 
February 2016, https://youtu.be/jaxihy0LVYk. 
7 H.K.J. Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, The Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 
2017-2019, 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/522c2552e4b0d3c39ccd1e00/t/5956897e78d1714f5b61f5c2/149
8843547605/JRP+2017-2019+-+Full+-+%28June+30%29.pdf, 7. 
8 Francis, 12. 
9 Anne Marie Baylouny, “Water Thieves or Political Catalysts? Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon,” 
Middle East Policy 25, no. 1 (2018): 108-9. 
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the average per capita water supply is 30 liters a day—50 liters short of the minimum 
requirement to satisfy basic needs.10 In Mafraq, water shortages have worsened “fourfold 
due to pressures from the Syrian influx.”11 According to the Jordan Response Plan, 
household energy consumption rose 34 percent since the beginning of the conflict, but the 
per-capita usage actually declined 21 percent. This trend suggests that demand in general 
is much higher, but on an individual basis the people cannot afford their electricity needs 
as before. This is because most Syrian refugees live outside of camps and in host 
communities, squeezing entire families into small garages or other one-room 
accommodations.12 
 As the Syrian crisis enters its eighth year with no end in sight, the implications of 
these issues must be considered for Jordan’s—and the region’s—continued stability and 
security. Continued reliance on immediate humanitarian aid from non-governmental 
organizations and the United Nations is neither sufficient nor sustainable. In 2017, the 
UNHCR only secured 57 percent of its $1.2 billion-dollar appeal for refugee response in 
Jordan, most of which went towards meeting immediate needs with food vouchers and 
drinking water and some long-term needs such as education.13 While these are important 
for basic survival of the refugee population, it does little to better their long-term 
prospects. This is especially important because refugee crises are generally becoming 
                                                          
10 Glada Lahn, Owen Grafham, and Adel Elsayed Sparr, Refugees and Energy Resilience in Jordan, Chatham 
House, 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/refugees-and-energy-resilience-jordan, 8. 
11 Francis, 10. 
12 H.K.J. Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, The Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 
2018-2020, 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/522c2552e4b0d3c39ccd1e00/t/5ab3565f8a922d5e4a011286/152
1702505515/JRP+Final+Copy+21-3.pdf, 20. 
13 “Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2017 Annual Report,” UNHCR, 2017, 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/63530. 
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“protracted situations”: 61 percent of refugees have been displaced for five or more 
years,14 and the UNHCR estimates that the average refugee (any, not specific to Syria) 
spends 17 years inside a refugee camp.15 With natural resources continuing to dwindle 
and populations continuing to rise, Jordan must look to other means of structural 
development to combat these issues and provide for both its citizens and guests.  
 One of the best alternative methods is developing the renewable energy sector. 
Renewable energy is typically considered a solution for energy cost savings and 
environmental degradation, not for a humanitarian crisis. However, there are several 
reasons to look towards renewable energy (RE) to combat this crisis, the first being that 
Jordan has great potential for renewables. The most common modes of renewable energy 
generation are solar (photovoltaic or PV), wind, hydroelectric, biomass, and geothermal. 
This thesis will focus primarily on a solar and wind RE approach given Jordan’s extreme 
water scarcity, the pollution caused by burning biomass, and the limited geographic 
locations suitable for geothermal energy usage. Located in the earth’s sunbelt and on hilly 
terrain, Jordan has the third largest non-hydropower capacity and largest photovoltaic 
capacity in the Middle East.16  
                                                          
14 Rebecca Gunning, The Current State of Sustainable Energy Provision for Displaced Populations: An 
Analysis, Chatham House, 2014, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/2014120EnergyDisplacedPopula
tionsGunning.pdf, 4. 
15 Brita Nielsen, “Designing for multiple stakeholder interests within the humanitarian market: 
the case of off-grid energy devices,” International Journal of Learning and Change 7 no. 1-2 (2013): 50. 
16 Ana V. Ibáñez Prieto, “Jordan 3rd in region in renewable energy capacity—FES,” Jordan Times, 23 
January 2018, http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan-3rdregion-renewable-energy-capacity-
%E2%80%94-fes; Fayez Abdulla et al., “Status of Jordan Renewable Energy Sector: Problems, Needs, and 
Challenges,” in Proceedings of the Regional Collaboration Workshop on Energy Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy Technology, 2004. 
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Renewable energy is also a sustainable alternative to traditional fossil fuels, both 
economically and environmentally. In fact, one study from Adam Smith International 
shows that “neglecting the green economy may currently cost Jordan more than 2 per 
cent of GDP a year in environmental degradation.”17 Jordan relied on imported heavy 
fuel oil as its primary energy source until the Egypt-Jordan Arab Gas Pipeline was 
erected in 2003. At its height in 2009, natural gas imported from Egypt provided for 91 
percent of Jordan’s electricity generation; however, due to a combination of high 
demand, low supply, and targeted attacks during the Arab Spring, the proportion fell to 
19 percent in 2012 and now the pipeline is no longer in service.18 Without domestic 
resource alternatives to make up for this gap in provision, the cutoff led to immediate 
energy shortages in the following years until Jordan secured more oil imports from 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.19 By developing its own renewable energy sector, Jordan can 
significantly decrease its dependence on others for energy and prevent another mass 
outage such as this. Developing the RE sector can also diversify the economy and 
promote job growth, which Jordan desperately needs. The planning, construction, 
management, and evaluation of solar and wind farms requires a vast array of employees, 
from engineers to accountants to laborers. 
Environmentally speaking, it is well known that burning fossil fuels is not a 
sustainable option for energy and electricity production. With an exponentially growing 
demand due to population growth and technological advancements, current non-
                                                          
17 Study of mechanisms to incentivize the financial sector to scale up financing of green investment in 
Jordan. Adam Smith International, 2013, 3. 
18 Jaber et al., 495. 
19 Ibid., 492. 
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renewables are predicted to run out within the century. Burning fossil fuels is also 
extremely detrimental to the environment, polluting the atmosphere and precious water 
resources. Renewables, as their name implies, are not finite resources and produce fewer 
CO2 emissions than traditional fuels.  
The Hashemite Kingdom has begun advocating for renewable energy growth 
within the country over the past decade. King Abdullah tends to emphasize the 
environmentally-friendly and sustainability aspects of renewables in his speeches at 
climate change summits, but in reality, the interest in RE spans much further to political 
and economic advantages.  
In this thesis, I argue that renewable energy—primarily solar and wind—can 
offset some of the negative effects on Jordanians and Syrians coming from the Syrian 
refugee crisis (SRC). It could provide more stability and independence in energy 
provision, create jobs, and conserve water consumption. There is also evidence that RE 
can indirectly better the livelihoods of both Jordanians and Syrians through improved 
environments for education and healthcare. If successful, Jordan’s renewable energy 
response to the crisis can revolutionize and set the new standard for worldwide 
humanitarian refugee response. 
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II. Framework & Literature Review 
The issues at hand in Jordan today  
This thesis looks at the potential for renewable energy to mitigate some of the 
problems caused or exacerbated by the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan. The effects of this 
crisis are vast, but I focus primarily on employment and natural resource consumption, 
because these were already large concerns for Jordan prior to the crisis and have 
worsened since. 
The first chapter of the Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis (JRP), published 
by the Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) in 2015 
and later updated in 2017, highlights many of these issues. Jordan’s pre-conflict GDP 
was growing at a rate of 15.2 percent annually, but now rests at just 6 percent. Public debt 
has grown exponentially to constitute nearly 93 percent of GDP, and foreign direct 
investment has decreased 42.6 percent.20 The JRP also mentions increased job 
competition, strained health and education sectors, poor waste and water management, 
and large increases in energy demand.  
It is important, however, to take publications from Jordanian ministries with a 
grain of salt—the government “consistently overstates the negative impacts of the Syrian 
refugee influx,”21 likely in attempt to secure more international funding. For example, as 
                                                          
20 The Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2017-2019, 7. 
21 Francis, 1. 
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mentioned earlier, the 2018-2020 JRP states that “the total residential electricity 
consumption increased by 34% between 2011 and 2016 […] while per capita 
consumption of electricity went down by 21% [...] demonstrating that people cannot 
afford the previous level of consumption.”22 However, using data from the Jordanian 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources’ 2017 Annual Report and the Department of 
Statistics’ Jordan in Numbers 2017 yields different results. The total residential electricity 
consumption did increase 34 percent from 2011 to 2016, but per capita usage did not 
decrease 21 percent; in fact, it increased 4.44 percent.23 It is unclear what data was used 
in the JRP to find a 21 percent decrease, as the document did not cite any sources. 
Detailed comparisons between the JRP’s claims and actual numbers calculated using 
MEMR’s data can be found in the Appendix, Table 11. 
Nevertheless, these government publications do describe the increased tensions 
and strained infrastructure in Jordan, even if exact numbers are sometimes exaggerated. 
These general findings are backed up by academic publications on the SRC from 
Chatham House, the UNHCR, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Adam 
Smith International, Human Rights Watch, and others. 
In order to examine how Jordan can begin to solve some of these problems 
through renewable energy (RE), I divide my focus into two parts: (1) the environmental 
benefits of RE and (2) the economic benefits of RE. 
                                                          
22 H.K.J. Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, The Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 
2018-2020, 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/522c2552e4b0d3c39ccd1e00/t/5ab3565f8a922d5e4a011286/152
1702505515/JRP+Final+Copy+21-3.pdf, 20. 
23 See Appendix, Table 11.  
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Environmentalism of renewable energy 
While looking at RE as a sustainable solution to combating the aforementioned 
issues, it is important to consider their environmental footprint. In general, clean 
renewable energy produces fewer CO2 emissions and consumes less water than 
traditional fossil fuel resources. This is especially important in Jordan, which suffers from 
extreme water scarcity and pollution. Evans, Evans, and Strezov tested several 
sustainability indicators for four common renewables and two fossil fuels, such as energy 
efficiency, water consumption, land use, and greenhouse gas emissions. They found that 
on average coal and gas produced the most CO2, followed by geothermal, PV, 
hydropower, and wind.24 However, emissions from hydropower vary greatly depending 
on the location of energy generation and can be as high as geothermal emissions. As for 
PV and wind, most of the pollutants are emitted during the manufacturing of panels and 
mills, and very little while actually generating energy.25 The rate of CO2 emissions for 
these two also vary greatly depending on the type of materials used. 
Wind and PV by far use the least amount of water. As with CO2 emissions, most 
of the water in PV and wind energies is used in the manufacturing of materials, not 
energy production.26 When it comes to energy efficiency, no other resource can compare 
to hydropower’s 90+ percent efficiency rate. Unfortunately, hydropower is not a feasible 
energy alternative in Jordan on a large scale. Wind comes in second, with a similar 
efficiency rating to coal and gas. PV efficiency levels are the lowest, but depend greatly 
                                                          
24 Annette Evans, Vladimir Strezov, and Tim J. Evans, “Assessment of sustainability indicators for 
renewable energy technologies,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 13 (2009): 1083. 
25 Ibid., 1084. 
26 Ibid., 1085. 
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on the type of cells installed—with higher quality products comes more efficient 
results.27 
Considering these three factors, wind and PV energy will be the best options for 
Jordan, environmentally. They are water-conscious, which is of utmost importance. They 
also produce very few greenhouse gases while still maintaining ample energy efficiency. 
The table below summarizes the findings from Evans’ study, ranking the sustainability of 
different energy sources from one to four, with the lowest score (1) being the most 
sustainable and the highest score (4) the least sustainable. 
Table 1: Sustainability Rankings of Four Renewables28 
 Photovoltaics Wind Hydro Geothermal 
Price 4 3 1 1 
CO2 emissions 3 1 2 4 
Availability and limitations 4 2 1 3 
Efficiency 4 2 1 3 
Land use 1 3 4 2 
Water consumption 2 1 3 4 
Social impacts 2 1 4 3 
Total 20 13 16 21 
 
Economics of renewable energy 
Perhaps the most immediate—and most important—effect of RE is job 
production. There is much discussion on exactly how many jobs the renewable sector 
                                                          
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 1086. 
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generates and how the job creation rate should best be measured. Studies show that 
renewable energy can produce anywhere between 1.7 to 14.7 times more jobs than 
traditional energy industries.29 This large range is in part due to the varying number of 
jobs that different RE technologies produce (i.e. PV tends to create more jobs than 
biomass).30 More importantly, however, studies tend to use two different markers for job 
growth, further widening the range.  
Dalton and Lewis and Llera et al. discuss this in great detail. The two common 
measurements for RE job creation is jobs/megawatt (MW) installed in one year and 
jobs/cumulative MW installed.31 Llera et al. and Dalton discuss these two modes and 
both agree that the latter is the most accurate way to depict growth. The former 
measurement can yield a deceptively high ratio due to the large front-load job creation in 
manufacturing and installation, and is also “often dictated by economic climate and 
government policy.”32 The latter is more indicative of the realistic long-term job 
sustainability. One factor that is not accounted for in either ratio, however, is if the jobs 
are domestically or internationally-sourced. Countries that are able to manufacture all 
components themselves will have a higher true job creation rate than those that must 
import the needed materials. Another thing to consider is that not all jobs related to the 
RE sector directly correlate with the number of megawatts installed. For example, the 
number of researchers, designers, and accountants hired to develop a solar or wind farm 
                                                          
29 E. Llera et al., “Forecasting job creation and renewable energy deployment through a value-chain 
approach,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 21 (2013): 263. 
30 Rosebud Jasmine Lambert and Patricia Pereira Silva, “The challenges of determining the employment 
effects of renewable energy,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 16 (2012): 4670, Table 2. 
31 G. J. Dalton and T. Lewis, “Metrics for measuring job creation by renewable energy technologies, using 
Ireland as a case study,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 15, no. 4 (2011): 2124. 
32 Ibid., 2131. 
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are not necessarily dependent on the number of MW installed.33 Despite this, using 
jobs/total MW installed is the most accurate and stable indicator currently available. 
Using this indicator, solar is the largest producer of jobs in the renewable industry.34 
 In refugee camps, data on RE job creation is limited. There are few refugee camps 
that have implemented large-scale renewable energy projects—in fact, Jordan was the 
first to do so in its Azraq and Za’atari Syrian refugee camps in 2017. Despite a lack of 
statistical data, preliminary findings have shown that the new RE projects have promoted 
some small boosts in the local camp economy.35 These projects provide refugees with 
valuable skills that they can utilize when they assimilate into the host communities 
(granted they obtain a work permit) or return back home.  
Figure 1: Amman, Za'atari, and Azraq 
 
                                                          
33 Llera et al., 264. 
34 A Guide to Renewable Energy in Egypt and Jordan, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2016, 
https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/12534.pdf, 157. 
35 Lahn et. al, 23-24. 
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 Developing the RE sector can have other positive direct and indirect effects on the 
local economy. The UNHCR expects to save upwards of $5,000,000 a year in electricity 
costs in Za’atari alone thanks to the solar plant,36 and can delegate these savings to other 
sectors to better the livelihoods of the residents living in the camp. Because of the 
increased energy sources at a lower cost, the provision of electricity in the camps has 
increased from eight to 12 hours a day,37 allowing people to work longer hours. In the 
same vein, providing electricity to power streetlights can have an indirect effect on 
education—a number of children do not attend school because they feel unsafe walking 
long distances throughout the camp in the dark.38  
 Taking into account both the environmental and economic factors of renewable 
energy production, PV and wind are the best options for Jordan. They consume the least 
amount of water, produce few greenhouse gases, are efficient at a sustainable level, 
promote job growth, diversify the economy, and indirectly affect people’s livelihoods in a 
positive way.
                                                          
36 “Jordan-Zaatari Refugee Camp December 2018,” UNHCR, 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67368, 4. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Gunning, 2-4. 
14 
 
III. Methodology 
 To fully answer the proposed question, I conducted three separate analyses. The 
first questioned the feasibility of a renewable energy sector in Jordan—though there is 
great physical opportunity for PV and wind, what is the political outlook on this 
development? I listened to several of King Abdullah II’s speeches at numerous climate 
change and Syrian crisis response summits to assess the image that Jordan attempts to 
portray concerning RE. I then inspected the steps the Government of Jordan (GoJ) has 
taken to promote this change. Important to this analysis were the examination of annual 
reports and strategic plans from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR). 
I analyzed not only the content of the documents (i.e. the extent of RE’s presence in its 
future plans and goals), but also their context: is RE the main topic of future 
developments, or a side project? Are the documents widely available in English and 
Arabic? Then, I examined how Jordan has reached out on an international scale to 
achieve the goals it has articulated. Most important of these are the Jordan Compact and 
the Jordan Response Plan, two corresponding agreements with the European Union that 
aim to transform the setbacks of the SRC in Jordan into a development opportunity for 
the state. Both documents stress the need for renewables. Based on these three elements, I 
determined that the foundational political will for RE in Jordan is significantly 
developed. 
Secondly, I conducted a case study of the Za’atari refugee camp in the northern 
Mafraq Governorate of Jordan. This was the first Syrian refugee camp established in the 
15 
 
Kingdom, located just 12 km from the southern border of Syria (See Figure 1). Over the 
years, it has become the largest Syrian refugee camp in the world and as such has been 
forced to better develop its infrastructure. In November 2017, a solar PV plant opened on 
the border of the camp that now powers the entire operation. Using UNHCR reports from 
their open-source online database, I outlined the effects on Za’atari and its residents since 
the construction and implementation of the on-site renewable energy plant. As stated in 
the introduction, I am most concerned with impacts on job creation, energy provision, 
water management, and resident livelihood. Though results are limited due to the recent 
nature of the plant’s launch, I found some links to indirect impacts on Syrian’s daily 
lives, such as increased school enrollment and improved health and WASH (water, 
sanitation, and hygiene) facilities. 
Finally, to put Jordan’s renewable sector to the test, I have made some basic 
projections based on current wind and PV projects in the country. Flanders Investment 
and Trade published a study in October 2017 that outlined all energy projects under 
construction in the Kingdom at the time. Using several different models, I estimated the 
potential job creation and water conservation should Jordan complete all 14 PV and wind 
projects listed by Flanders. Because unemployment and water sustainability are two big 
issues exacerbated by the SRC in Jordan, RE’s potential to alleviate some of these 
struggles is imperative to Jordan’s stability. 
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IV. Analysis: RE Progress  
In the past decade, even before the onset of the Syrian crisis, the Jordanian 
government began advocating for the development of renewable energy in the country 
through compelling speeches at international conferences, implementing laws, and setting 
statewide goals and initiatives. At the 21st meeting of the UN Climate Change Conference 
(COP21) in 2015, King Abdullah II emphasized the global responsibility for green 
alternatives, the Syrian crisis, and Jordan’s steps towards the future: 
The subject of this conference is also the fight of our generation […] We must act 
collectively, with foresight, responsibility and determination […] Jordan is 
already the second water-poorest country on earth. We import more than 90 
percent of our energy […] Meantime, we remain a safe haven for refugees fleeing 
regional violence. Now […] Jordan has one of the top two refugee populations per 
capita in the world […] These harsh realities are why Jordan has been integrating 
energy and environmental approaches into a sustainable, long-term national 
development strategy. In 2013, we were the first in our region to produce a 
comprehensive, forward-looking National Climate Change Policy. In the past year 
alone, we have made greater strides towards energy independence and enhancing 
energy efficiency than in the entire life of our country.39 
This statement is significant, as it begins to emphasize the link between the refugee crisis 
and renewables as a potential solution. At the Jordan-U.S. Business Forum, a conference 
dedicated to facilitating business opportunities between the two states,40 the King also 
said that “problems of cost and reliability mean we must diversify energy resources […] 
                                                          
39 “His Majesty Speeches,” Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. 
40 “Jordan-US Business Forum,” Embassy of Jordan, http://jordanembassyus.org/gallery/jordan-us-
business-forum. 
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the first Jordan-U.S. Business Forum produced new projects in renewable energy, but 
there are still tremendous opportunities to be explored.”41 
Jordan further projected this progressive image with the passage of Law 13 of 
2012 for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (Law 13). This law incentivizes 
investment in renewable energy in several ways. Regarding the development of a RE 
project, Article 5a authorizes the MEMR to issue tenders to “attract competitive 
proposals,”42 which allows the Ministry to get a good deal on investments. It also lets 
both foreign and domestic companies investing in renewable energy projects bypass the 
typically complex bidding process and instead negotiate directly with the Minister of 
Energy, allowing for quicker and more streamlined deals.43 Article 11a removes custom 
duties and sales tax from all equipment and systems purchased for renewable energy 
projects, further decreasing the previously hefty price of investing in RE. Finally, articles 
12-16 establish the Jordan Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Fund (JREEEF). 
Domestic and international organizations with blueprints for renewable energy projects 
can apply for funding from the JREEEF, which is financed by the state’s general budget, 
returns on investments, and donations. The JREEEF would provide assistance at every 
level of development. Law 13 establishes the fund’s hierarchical administration, granting 
it significant power and independence. The JREEEF only recently became active. In May 
2015, the fund had yet to be formed,44 but the MEMR’s Annual Report 2017 mentions 
                                                          
41 RHC JO, “King Abdullah II Remakrs [sic] at the Second Jordan-US Business Forum,” YouTube video, 
10:23, 9 March 2013, https://youtu.be/WcY5KArexmA. 
42 “Renewable Energy & Energy Efficiency (Law No. 13),” International Energy Agency, 23 July 2013, 
https://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/jordan/name-36862-en.php. 
43 Ibid. 
44 J.O. Jaber et. al, 498. 
18 
 
that the “[JREEEF’s] investment achieved JOD 50 million and created more than 200 
permanent jobs.”45  
Another document published by MEMR, the Updated Master Strategy of Energy 
Sector in Jordan 2007-2020 (Master Strategy), also displays the government’s 
commitment to renewable energy. The Ministry originally composed the Master Strategy 
in 2004 and then updated it in 2007. This document presents the total energy mix goals 
for 2020, including an increase in renewable energy and oil shale. It also provides the 
estimated costs of constructing and running new energy projects, obstacles to success in 
implementing these projects, and recommendations for moving forward. 
A thorough analysis exposed major errors in the document, however, revealing 
the inefficient and inconsistent inner workings of the Jordanian ministries and their 
attitudes toward meeting commitments compared to the public image of change they have 
promoted. The Master Strategy is somewhat difficult to follow as it has been translated 
from Arabic to English. Due to the translation there are some discrepancies in the exact 
numbers, but in general the Master Strategy calls for the share of RE in the total energy 
mix to increase from 2007 to 2020.46 The table below lists the amounts (in tonnes of oil 
equivalent, TOE) of five different types of energy needed to achieve the “medium 
scenario” in 2020, though the meaning or explanation of this scenario is never given. 
                                                          
45 H.K.J. Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Annual Report 2017, 
http://www.memr.gov.jo/echobusv3.0/SystemAssets/469adf39-0f2f-4d01-a72b-d394c3b56332.pdf, 53. 
46 H.K.J. Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Updated Master Strategy of Energy Sector in Jordan for 
the period (2007-2020), 
http://www.memr.gov.jo/EchoBusV3.0/SystemAssets/PDFs/EN/energystrategy.pdf, 6-7. 
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Table 2: Jordan’s Energy Demand Forecast (quantities in thousand TOE) 47 
Energy Type 
Year 
2007 2010 2015 2020 
Fuel oil 679 637 765 928 
Diesel 1889 2174 2652 3203 
Gasoline 806 928 1115 1321 
LPG 364 418 510 619 
Kerosene 163 186 227 274 
Aircraft fuel (Avtur) 260 298 356 423 
Asphalt 163 175 190 205 
Natural gas (imported) 2469 3761 4335 3778 
Natural gas (local) 143 65 68 0 
Oil shale 0 0 976 2436 
Renewable energy 107 122 745 1362 
Imported electricity 533 533 533 533 
Total [original] 7577 9298 1247 15084 
Total [corrected] 7576 9297 12472 15082 
 
 
The figures following this table in the Master Strategy portray the proportions of 
the energy mix in pie charts, though the numbers are incorrect. For example, the chart in 
the Master Strategy labels renewable energy as 6 percent of the total energy mix in 2020 
in this scenario, though according to the data provided in Table 3 below it would be 9 
percent. 
 
                                                          
47 Ibid., 6. 
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Table 3: Jordan’s Energy Demand Forecast (% of total) 
Energy Type 
Year 
2007 2010 2015 2020 
Fuel oil 8.9% 6.8% 6.1% 6.2% 
Diesel 24.9% 23.3% 21.3% 21.2% 
Gasoline 10.6% 10% 8.9% 8.8% 
LPG 4.8% 4.5% 4.1% 4.1% 
Kerosene 2.2% 2% 1.8% 1.8% 
Aircraft fuel (Avtur) 3.4% 3.2% 2.9% 2.8% 
Asphalt 2.2% 1.9% 1.5% 1.4% 
Natural gas (imported) 32.6% 40.5% 34.8% 25% 
Natural gas (local) 1.9% 0.7% 0.5% 0% 
Oil shale 0% 0% 7.8% 16.2% 
Renewable energy 1.4% 1.3% 6% 9% 
Imported electricity 7% 5.7% 4.3% 3.5% 
 
 
Later, the Master Strategy provides another table listing eight different scenarios 
for energy production in 2020. None of the eight scenarios match the data given for the 
so-called “medium scenario,” and all eight list renewable energy as 10 percent of the mix. 
Additionally, none of the scenarios in this table add to be 100 percent. These are serious 
discrepancies that diminish the legitimacy of the Master Strategy. It is unclear whether 
these miscalculations are due to mathematical or translation errors, as the original 
document in Arabic is not available on the Arabic MEMR website. However, one can 
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presume that these errors derived from neglect rather than translation, as both languages 
use the same set of Arabic numerals. 
 Despite these flaws in numerical data, the Master Strategy does provide important 
information regarding the future of RE in Jordan. It reiterates the state’s push towards 
energy alternatives by increasing percentages of renewable energy in the total energy mix 
every year, although new domestic oil shale projects receive the largest share of 
increases. It states that high investment costs and a lack of special legislation are 
significant barriers to the renewable sector,48 and suggests that the government issue a 
law that will “stimulate the private sector to increase its investments in this domain” and 
create a fund to finance new RE projects.49 The government passed Law 13 a few years 
later in response to these issues. 
 In 2015, the MOPIC published its first version of the complex Jordan Response 
Plan (JRP), a “bold and innovative initiative to bring together humanitarian and 
development programming under a common, nationally-led and resilience-based 
framework […] which successfully laid the groundwork for a series of achievements that 
allowed the Kingdom to withstand the devastating impact of the [refugee] crisis.”50 In 
this document, the ideas of renewable energy solutions and the refugee crisis begin to 
converge. A year before the JRP was first published, the Jordan Response Platform for 
the Syria Crisis (JRPSC) was established, a group of representatives from the Jordanian 
government, donors, international NGOs, and the UN, tasked with implementing and 
                                                          
48 Ibid, 4. 
49 Ibid, 21. 
50 The Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2017-2019, v. 
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monitoring the response plans.51 Under the authority of the JRPSC are 12 task forces, 
each charged with research and policy-making responsibilities for Jordan’s most critical 
sectors throughout the Syrian crisis: education, energy, environment, food security, 
health, justice, livelihood, municipal services, shelter, social protection, transport, and 
WASH.52 The initial JRP struggled to obtain even a third of its annual desired funding, 
but was helped with the signing of the Jordan Compact (JC) in 2016. This JC was signed 
between the European Union and Jordan, promising the Kingdom billions of dollars in 
grants and loans as well as lax trade regulations on the condition that Jordan allow Syrian 
refugees to obtain work permits.53 The three pillars of the Jordan Compact’s goal are to 
(1) turn the Syrian refugee crisis into a development opportunity, (2) rebuild host 
communities by financing the JRP, and (3) mobilize grants to support Jordan’s 
macroeconomic framework.54 Consequently, the updated Jordan Response Plan for 2016-
2018 secured 54 percent of its funding, a substantial increase.55  
 Aside from some setbacks, the Jordanian government has proved overall that it is 
serious about revolutionizing its energy sector by passing laws, signing international 
agreements, and advocating for RE at large-scale public forums. In the following two 
sections, I highlight the changes that have occurred in Syrian refugee camps and host 
communities due to these pushes for renewable energy in the Kingdom.
                                                          
51 Ibid., 10. 
52 Ibid. 
53 “The Jordan Compact: A New Holistic Approach between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the 
International Community to deal with the Syrian Refugee Crisis,” Ministry of Planning and International 
Cooperation, http://www.mop.gov.jo/DetailsPage/NewsDetailsEN.aspx?NewsID=718. 
54 Ibid. 
55 The Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2017-2019, v. 
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V. Case Study: Za’atari 
Za’atari, the first Syrian refugee camp in Jordan, opened July 2012 in the 
northeastern municipality of Mafraq. Za’atari is not only the largest refugee camp in 
Jordan, but is now also the largest Syrian refugee camp in the world.56 At its peak in 
April 2013, Za’atari housed an astonishing 202,993 refugees57 in an area slightly larger 
than 2 square miles; however, since mid-2014 the population has decreased and leveled 
out to around 80,000, with many refugee families opting to move into Jordanian cities or 
even return home to Syria.58 The camp’s first few years were characterized by dilapidated 
conditions: little to no infrastructure to manage water, waste, or electricity in combination 
with a militant, hostile in-camp host governance and post-traumatic stress led to several 
protests and attacks against international humanitarian aid workers and UNHCR staff.59 
As the UNHCR struggled to keep up with the thousands of daily new arrivals, Gulf 
states—primarily Saudi Arabia—increased assistance to purchase semi-permanent 
caravans to replace the canvas tents that occupied the west side of the camp. With the 
provision of newer and sturdier living facilities, residents began to wire electricity to their 
homes, set up small shops and restaurants, and create their own internal economy 
                                                          
56 “Syrian Regional Refugee Response,” UNHCR, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36. 
57 Ibid. 
58 “Zaatari Refugee Camp Factsheet February 2015,” UNHCR, 2015, 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/45767, 1. 
59 Sakhr Al-Makhadhi, “A city emerges,” The National, 12 December 2013, 
https://www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/a-city-emerges-1.252218#full. 
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financed by vouchers and donated relief items.60 At its height in 2013, the Za’atari 
refugee camp had become Jordan’s fifth largest city. 
Table 4: Population of Jordan's Largest Cities and Refugee Camps 
City Population61 
Amman 1,812,059 
Zarqa 635,160 
Irbid 502,714 
Russeifa 472,604 
Al Quwaysimah* 296,763 
Tila al-Ali* 251,000 
Wadi al-Seer* 241,830 
Za’atari Refugee Camp 202,993 
Jubeiha* 197,160 
Khraiba al-Souq* 186,158 
*These were listed as cities in the dataset but are typically  
regarded as part of the capital city Amman, making the  
Za’atari refugee camp the fifth, not eighth, largest city. 
Now, the camp has progressed and adapted to become a permanent fixture. A 
2017 UNHCR survey revealed that 73 percent of Syrian refugees have “no intention to 
return [to Syria] in the next 12 months.”62 Amidst all the immediate humanitarian needs 
that the UNHCR must address on a daily basis—providing water, food, and health 
services—they were also growing increasingly concerned about the makeshift 
infrastructure of the camp. One of the most pressing issues was electricity: the UN was 
spending upwards of $1M USD a month to provide electricity to caravans and tents in 
                                                          
60 Alison Ledwith, Zaatari: The Instant City, Boston: Affordable Housing Institute, 2014, 10-26. 
61 “Jordan: Governorates, Major Cities & Urban Localities,” http://www.citypopulation.de/Jordan-
Cities.html. 
62 “Syrian refugees in Jordan, A protection overview,” Jordan INGO Forum, 2018, 
http://testsite.jordaningoforum.org/wp-content/uploads/JIF-ProtectionBrief-2017-Final.pdf, 16. 
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Za’atari. In order to alleviate spending, they limited electricity to run only eight hours a 
day between the hours of 6pm and 2am,63 reducing costs to $500,000 USD a month 
during the summer and $700,000 USD a month during the winter.64 The upkeep and 
monitoring of electricity usage was nearly impossible to manage. By 2013, 73 percent of 
households had illegally wired a private connection to their homes from the public 
streetlight grid. Tangled messes of makeshift wiring hookups made maintenance 
extremely difficult and created a major fire hazard, which proved to be critical in the 
winter months that brought flooding and electricity outages. Accurate data on per-capita 
energy usage is limited because each electricity meter was split between seven buildings 
each.65 
In response to the growing energy crisis, the construction of a solar PV power 
plant on the border of the camp began in April 2017. The $17.5M project funded by the 
German government66 is actually the second refugee camp in the world to be run on 
renewable energy—the Azraq refugee camp located about 30 miles southeast was the 
first. With a peak capacity of 12.9 MW an hour under ideal conditions, the 40,000 solar 
panels can now provide 12 to 14 hours of electricity every day to every single residential 
building in Za’atari.67 With this provision, each household in Za’atari can use 
                                                          
63 Taylor Luck, “World’s biggest solar power plant for a refugee camp opens in Zaatari,” The National, 13 
November 2017, https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/worlds-biggest-solar-power-plant-for-a-
refugee-camp-opens-in-zaatari-1.675484. 
64 Ledwith, 32. 
65 Ibid., 30. 
66 Marwa Hashem, “Jordan’s Za’atari camp goes green with new solar plant,” UNHCR, 14 November 2017, 
https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2017/11/5a0ab9854/jordans-zaatari-camp green-new-solar-
plant.html. 
67 “Electrification Factsheet Zaatari Camp - Jordan,” UNHCR, 2018, 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/64899. 
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approximately 936 kWh annually; in comparison, the average individual living in Jordan 
outside of the camps will consume 1,244 kWh a year.68 
For the UNHCR, this means significant savings for a desperately underfunded 
budget. The organization expects to save $5M each year in energy costs, resulting in an 
80 percent savings.69 The plant’s production has also provided new job opportunities for 
both Jordanians and in-camp refugees. 38 percent of the plant was constructed by camp 
residents,70 and the Jordanian National Electric Power Company (NEPCO) and the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) expect to train another 200 refugees to wire 
new connections, make repairs, and maintain aspects of the solar plant.71 These are 
valued skills that trainees can continue to use inside and outside of the camp. 
Additionally, the plant will also improve Za’atari’s carbon footprint by reducing CO2 
emissions by 15,600 tons a year. 
Though the solar plant only recently opened, the residents can already expect to 
see the impact of some of its benefits to the community. With more electricity per day, 
residents can keep shops and restaurants open longer, increasing their revenues. The 
ability to keep the lights on for extended amounts of time is particularly important for the 
20 percent of women who are head of the household72 and for those who depend on 
creating handmade goods at home as a main source of income. In general, the ability to 
power the 2,600 streetlights in the camp at all hours of the night will help to increase 
                                                          
68 See Appendix, Table 11. 
69 “Electrification Factsheet Zaatari Camp – Jordan,” UNHCR. 
70 Ibid. 
71 “UNHCR and JICA launch Electricity Training programme for Syrian Refugees in Zaatari Refugee Camp,” 
Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2 August 2016, 
https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2016/160802_01.html. 
72 “Jordan - Zaatari Refugee Camp December 2018,” UNHCR. 
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safety and mitigate crime. A week after the project was completed, the UNHCR 
conducted a news report in which they interviewed several residents about the solar plant. 
One mother said it would “keep her children healthy and safe,” citing that because she 
had to wash clothes at night, they would not dry properly overnight and often made her 
family sick.73 One child said that with more electricity he will be able to complete his 
homework and study for school.74 Another interviewee who worked on the construction 
of the solar plant said the technical skills he gained in doing so led to him landing a job in 
the renewable sector outside of the camp.75 In 2012, Practical Action outlined several 
livelihood standards that are directly linked to energy and electricity consumption, such 
as light hours per day, cooking and water heating, space heating and cooling, and 
information and communication technologies.76 Electricity can also be directly tied to 
health, as WASH facilities need water heaters for showering and clinics require adequate 
technologies to keep vaccines and medications cool.77 With an increase in electricity 
provision in the refugee camps, residents can benefit from improvements in some of these 
areas. 
 
  
                                                          
73 Hashem, “Jordan’s Za’atari camp goes green.” 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Gunning, 8. 
77 Ibid., 5. 
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VI. Analysis: Basic Projections 
Job creation 
 The previous sections have shown that the Jordanian government has created an 
environment encouraging RE development and that RE technologies have improved the 
livelihoods of Syrians living in the Za’atari refugee camp in northern Jordan. This section 
broadens the scope to a national scale. Here, I have calculated projections on job creation 
and water conservation based on the construction of the 14 largest wind and solar PV 
projects under construction or planned for Jordan as of October 2017. The following table 
outlines the projects’ capacity in megawatts (MW) and Figure 2 shows their locations. 
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Table 5: Planned PV and Wind Projects in Jordan, 201778 
Name Type Governorate Capacity (MW) 
Al Quweira Solar Plant PV Aqaba 103 
Al Safawi Solar PV Project PV Mafraq 51 
Baynouna Solar Energy Project PV Amman 200 
FRV Al Mafraq Solar PV Projects (2) PV Mafraq 133.4 
King’s Academy Solar Power Plant PV Amman 2.6 
Mafraq Solar PV Project PV Mafraq 60.3 
Risha Solar Energy Project PV Mafraq 61.3 
South Amman Solar Power Project PV Amman 30 
Wheeling Solar Project PV Unknown 34 
Al-Rafej Wind Farm Project Wind Ma’an 82 
Fujeij Wind Farm Wind Ma’an 89.1 
New Tafileh Wind Plant Wind Tafileh 50 
New Tafileh Wind Plant 2 Wind Tafileh 50 
Shobak Wind Project Wind Ma’an 45 
TOTAL   991.7 MW 
 Here, capacity is measured in MW installed. For example, the Al Quweira Solar 
Plant will have an installed capacity of 103 MW upon completion. This means that under 
perfect conditions and max capacity—that is, no obstruction of sunlight, mounting the 
panels at a specific angle, air temperature, etc.—the Al Quweira Solar Plant is capable of 
producing 103 MW/hour. Obtaining perfect conditions outside of a laboratory is rare, so 
it is highly unlikely that the Al Quweira plant will produce 103 MW/hour, also known as 
megawatt peak or MWp. However, in this case, the metrics used to estimate job creation 
                                                          
78 Energy Projects in Jordan, Flanders Investment & Trade, October 2017, 
https://www.flandersinvestmentandtrade.com/export/sites/trade/files/market_studies/Energy%20proje
cts%20in%20Jordan.pdf, 11-22. 
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depend solely on MW installed, not energy efficiency. Therefore, efficiency will not be 
discussed in this section.  
Figure 2: Map of PV and Wind Projects in Jordan, 2017 
 
As mentioned in Section II, there are several ways to measure job creation due to 
renewable sector development. Many academics, such as Dalton and Lewis, argue that 
measuring jobs/total MW installed is a more accurate depiction than jobs/MW installed 
per year, while others create their own measurements. In this section, I calculate the 
potential job creation for these projects using total MW installed based on models from 
both Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and Lahn et. al. 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung’s special report on renewable energy in Egypt and Jordan 
claims that 1 MW installed PV power will produce 6.96 to 11.01 jobs, and 1 MW 
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installed wind power will produce 0.70 to 2.78 jobs.79 In a workshop conducted in 
Amman in 2016, participants reported to Lahn et. al that 2 MW installed PV power will 
create up to 23 jobs (or 11.5 jobs for 1 MW).80 Based on these models, I can estimate that 
over the total lifetime of all wind projects, 221 to 879 jobs will be created; for all solar 
projects, 4,702 to 7,539 jobs will be created. Results are shown in the following tables.  
Table 6: Projected wind job creation in Jordan, FES model 
Name 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Job Creation 
Low Estimate 
(0.70/1 MW) 
High Estimate  
(2.78/1 MW) 
Shobak Wind Project 45 31.5 125.1 
New Tafileh Wind Plant 50 35 139 
New Tafileh Wind Plant 2 50 35 139 
Al-Rajef Wind Farm Project 82 57.4 227.96 
Fujeij Wind Farm 89.1 62.37 247.7 
Total 316.1 MW 221.27 jobs 878.76 jobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
79 A Guide to Renewable Energy in Egypt and Jordan, 157. 
80 Lahn et. al, 23. 
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Table 7: Projected PV job creation in Jordan, both models 
Name 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Job Creation 
FES Low 
Estimate 
(6.96/1 MW) 
 FES High 
Estimate 
(11.01/1 MW) 
Lahn 
Estimate 
King’s Academy Solar 
Power Plant 
2.6 18.1 28.63 29.9 
South Amman Solar 
Power Project 
30 208.8 330.3 345 
Wheeling Solar Project 34 236.64 374.34 391 
Al Safawi Solar PV 
Project 
51 354.96 561.51 586.5 
Mafraq Solar PV 
Project 
60.3 419.69 663.9 693.45 
Risha Solar Energy 
Project 
61.3 426.65 674.91 704.95 
Al Quweira Solar Plant 103 716.88 1134.03 1184.5 
FRV Al Mafraq Solar 
PV Projects (2) 
133.4 928.46 1468.73 1304.1 
Bayouna Solar Energy 
Project 
200 1392 2202 2300 
Total 
675.6 
MW 
4,702.18 jobs 7,438.35 jobs 7,539.4 jobs 
 It is important to note that these projections are contingent upon all levels of the 
supply chain being domestic (i.e. all equipment manufacturing, assembly, design, 
management being done within Jordan’s borders). Currently, Jordan does not have the 
capacity to do so, and many of the investors and manufacturers are international.81 
Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that these projects will produce the calculated number 
of jobs at this point in time. It is possible, however, that if Jordan continues to develop its 
renewable energy sector, more of these jobs can be produced domestically. 
                                                          
81 Energy Projects in Jordan, 11-22. 
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Water conservation 
 To make basic projections on the potential water savings of renewable energy 
sources, I used two statistical findings from Evans’s study. First, I outlined the efficiency 
of electricity generation for solar PV and wind as well as natural gas and coal, two 
common non-renewable resources used in electricity production. Then, I projected the 
water consumption for PV, wind, natural gas, and coal in their electricity production.  
Evans found that of six major energy sources for electricity generation (PV, wind, 
hydro, geothermal, coal, and natural gas), hydropower was the most energy-efficient and 
PV the least. Because Jordan uses a negligible amount of hydro and geothermal power in 
its total energy mix, this section will focus on the other four means of electricity 
generation. Though one document published by the MEMR provides some numbers on 
energy and electricity imports, the exact proportion of natural gas, coal, and oil usage in 
producing electricity in Jordan is unknown. The following table summarizes Evans’ 
findings on efficiency. 
Table 8: Efficiency of Electricity Generation82 
Type % Efficiency 
Photovoltaic 4-22% 
Wind 24-54% 
Coal 32-45% 
Gas 45-53% 
 
                                                          
82 Evans, 1085. 
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Here, energy efficiency means generating a high rate of megawatt hours (MWh) 
in ratio to its max capacity (MW or MWp).83 For example, if a 15 MW wind farm 
operated at 30 percent efficiency, it would produce 39,420 MWh annually: 
15 MW · 0.30 · 365 days · 24 hours = 39,430 MWh/year 
If Jordan completely installs all the proposed projects, it will create an aggregate 
of 675.6 MW solar PV capacity and 316.1 MW wind capacity for a total of 991.7 MW, as 
seen in Table 5 and below in Table 9. Using the same formula above, I have calculated 
the highest and lowest potential annual gigawatt hours (GWh) output for both PV and 
wind, based off Evans’ given efficiencies.  
Table 9: Projected Annual Electricity Production for RE Projects 
 Combined 
Projects’ 
Capacity 
Low Estimate* High Estimate* 
PV 675.6 MW 236.73 GWh 1,302.02 GWh 
Wind 316.1 MW 664.59 GWh 1,495.28 GWh 
Total 991.7 MW 901.32 GWh 2,797.30 GWh 
*1 GWh = 1,000 MWh = 1,000,000 kWh 
Because water consumption during electricity generation is based on efficiency, I 
have calculated the low and high estimates for coal and natural gas’ electricity 
consumption at 991.7 MW (the equivalent of all combined proposed PV and wind 
projects) in order to compare them evenly. They have been added to the chart below: 
 
                                                          
83 “Energy and Power Units,” Industrial Wind Energy Opposition, http://www.aweo.org/windunits.html. 
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Table 10: Projected Annual Electricity Production for Four Resources 
 Capacity Low Estimate High Estimate 
PV + Wind 991.7 MW 901.32 GWh 2,797.30 GWh 
Coal 991.7 MW 2,779.93 GWh 3,909.28 GWh 
Natural Gas 991.7 MW 3,909.28 GWh 4,604.26 GWh 
Evans also provides the average water consumption for electricity generation for 
each resource. Wind uses the least amount of water at 1kg water/1kWh electricity 
produced, followed by solar PV at 10kg/1kWh and then coal, natural gas, and oil, all 
reaching 78kg/1kWh.84 Using these rates, I have estimated the annual water consumption 
for PV + wind, coal, and natural gas for both their low estimated efficiencies and high 
estimated efficiencies at 991.7 MW capacity. 
Table 11: Estimated Water Consumption for Four Resources at 991.7 MW 
 Low Estimate (tonnes 
water/year)* 
High Estimate (tonnes 
water/year)* 
PV + Wind 3,031,871.04 14,515,442.64 
Coal 216,834,808.32 304,923,949.20 
Natural Gas 304,923,949.20 359,132,651.28 
*1 tonne = 1,000 kg 
As seen in the chart above, when these three energy resources generate the same 
amount of electricity, they consume vastly different amounts of water in the process. At 
their largest gaps, natural gas consumes up to 118.45 times more water than the RE mix 
and coal consumes up to 100.57 times more. These are significant differences, especially 
for the third water-poorest country in the world. 
                                                          
84 Herbert Inhaber, “Water Use in Renewable and Conventional Electricity Production,” Energy Sources 26 
(2004): 317. 
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VII. Results 
Readiness and promotion of the RE sector by the GoJ 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has ample, fertile ground to develop its 
renewable energy sector and in doing so can help alleviate some of the detrimental effects 
caused by the Syrian refugee crisis, particularly energy and water shortages, 
unemployment, and diminished livelihoods. The Government of Jordan has taken several 
steps to implement changes to encourage both foreign and domestic investment in the RE 
sector. Over the past decade, the Kingdom has emphasized the need for RE, mostly on 
the basis of its environmental benefits and the need to decrease heavy reliance on 
imported energy. However, the benefits of RE for Jordan go much further. Renewable 
energy is a cleaner alternative to traditional fossil fuels, providing much more sustainable 
and earth-friendly energy that emits far fewer greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. It 
also promotes job growth among a wide range of fields, especially in STEM. The 
required specialization of maintaining and constructing renewable energy plants varies 
from novice to expert, allowing laborers and engineers from all steps in their career to 
find work in RE. Renewable energy—especially PV and wind, which Jordan is most 
qualified to run—consumes eight to 80 times less water to generate electricity than coal, 
oil, or natural gas. This is especially important for Jordan, the third most water scarce 
country on earth. All of these savings are critical, given that the SRC has driven up 
unemployment, further diminished limited water resources, and strained state 
infrastructure. 
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Jordan understands these benefits and their role in combating the refugee crisis, 
given the production and signing of the Jordan Compact and Jordan Response Plan. The 
first goal of the JC explicitly states that it aims to turn the SRC into an investment and 
development opportunity. The JRP and JC were signed by the European Union on the 
condition that Jordan would allow Syrian refugees to finally obtain legal work permits, 
which has begun in small numbers. The complex JRP agreement lists detailed goals in 
varying sectors of the country to mitigate the effects felt from the crisis, including goals 
for the environment and the energy sector. With massive amounts of funding from the 
participating EU countries, Jordan has begun construction on several renewable energy 
projects around the county: most notably the Za’atari refugee camp. 
Za’atari’s solar plant 
Prior to the installation of a 12.9 MWp solar PV plant in Za’atari, the camp was 
struggling with numerous issues concerning its infrastructure, namely electricity. With 
such a large population growth in a short amount of time, the UNHCR was struggling to 
keep the lights on; to save on running costs, the organization decided to restrict electricity 
to eight hours a day. As a result, many felt unsafe walking around the camp at night, 
raced to charge their necessary electronics during the allotted window, and worked fewer 
hours. After implementation of the PV plant, the residents started to notice changes. The 
construction of the plant itself hired several hundred local Jordanians and Syrian refugees 
through the cash transfer program. An initiative between Japan and Jordan trained 
another 200 Syrians how to upkeep the PV plant and monitor safety hazards, awarding 
them lifelong skills transferable outside of the camp. Women feel safer walking to 
WASH facilities in the middle of the night now that the streetlights are guaranteed to be 
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on, and children say they can complete their schoolwork and study more with longer light 
hours at home. Ultimately, the UNHCR is saving $5M USD annually on electricity costs 
alone, a savings of nearly 80 percent. The solar panels are also self-sufficient and will 
continue to generate electricity without significant input costs.  
The implications of this are very important as the UNHCR may soon have to 
absorb the responsibilities of UNRWA, a relief agency set up specifically for Palestinian 
refugees in the Levant. In September of 2018, the United States—UNRWA’s largest 
donor every year since its inception in 1949—announced it was officially cutting off all 
of its $125M funding to the agency.85 Without another donor to make up for this deficit, 
the agency which serves over 5 million refugees in the region (and 2.2 million in Jordan 
alone)86 will have to make extreme cutbacks in its services or shutter its doors entirely. If 
so, the UNHCR will likely have to pick up what UNRWA left behind. Hopefully this is 
not the case, and UNHCR can allocate its $5M savings to address other developmental 
refugee needs; in the unfortunate event that it does, though, the UNHCR will have some 
extra funds to allocate to UNRWA’s budget.  
Job creation 
 As the potential for renewable energy generation in Jordan is great, so are the job 
opportunities. In the previous analysis, I made basic projections for the jobs created in 
order to completely construct and upkeep 14 PV and wind projects in Jordan using 
several different indicators. The first came from Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, which 
                                                          
85 Clare Foran and Elise Labott, “US ends all funding to UN agency for Palestinian refugees,” CNN, 01 
September 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/31/politics/trump-administration-ending-funding-
palestinian-refugees/index.html. 
86 “Annual Operational Report 2016,” UNRWA, 2017, 6. 
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estimated that PV creates 6.96 to 11.91 jobs per MW installed and 0.70 to 2.78 jobs per 
MW installed of wind energy. Based on their measurements, the combined 991.7 
installed MW of the 14 renewable energy projects would produce 4,923.45 to 8,317.11 
new jobs. According to Dalton and Lewis and Llera et. al, this estimate is contingent on 
all levels of operation—manufacturing, construction, installation, operation, and 
maintenance—being done domestically. Lahn’s fieldwork in Amman gives a more direct 
ratio of employment: a 2 MW PV plant will employ three Jordanians and up to 20 
Syrians (“12 people for the duration of construction and others as needed.”)87 Therefore, 
her high estimate for PV job creation in Jordan’s case is 11.5 jobs per MW. 
 Lahn’s workshops are very helpful in forming this model because they explicitly 
state the ratio of Jordanians to Syrians in employment for PV projects, unlike FES’ model 
which is based on global aggregates. She later quotes a study conducted by EDAMA that 
found the “clean tech private sector (renewable energy, energy efficiency, water and solid 
waste management) has the potential to create nearly 19,000 new jobs over the next five 
years […] account[ing] for almost 10 per cent of the total number of jobs expected 
through the Jordan Compact.”88 Here, it is evident that the job creation potential 
reverberates from the initial construction of the plants into the private sector.  
 In Jordan, the creation of new jobs is vital to both the economic and social 
wellbeing of the state. The unemployment rate of Jordanians grew from 14.5 percent 
before the Syrian crisis to 22 percent in 2014.89 While generally Jordanians express 
                                                          
87 Lahn et. al, 23. 
88 Ibid., 23-24. 
89 Francis, 12.  
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feelings of sympathy and solidarity for Syrians in Jordanian host communities,90 
animosity and negative feelings towards Syrian refugees is very common. A survey from 
the International Labor Organization revealed that 96 percent of Jordanians “believed 
Syrians were taking their jobs.”91 CARE International’s findings report a lower yet still 
significant percentage: on average, 62 percent of surveyed Jordanians claimed that Syrian 
refugees negatively impacted their ability to find or maintain a job, reaching nearly 71 
percent of respondents in the Irbid governorate.92 In Lahn’s workshops, many 
participants argued over the ratio of Syrians to Jordanians to be hired for these projects, 
but all agreed that “the current situation was unsustainable and detrimental to the 
Jordanian economy,”93 suggesting that this progress was better than nothing at all. 
Water conservation 
 The water savings of the 991.7 MW renewable projects is substantial. At 991.7 
MW capacity, the PV + wind combination can generate an estimated 900 to 3000 GWh 
of electricity a year, consuming nearly 3 to 14.5 million tonnes of water in the process. At 
the same capacity, coal will generate about 2800 to 3900 GWh of electricity and consume 
217 to 315 million tonnes of water; natural gas will generate about 3900 to 4600 GWh of 
electricity and consume 305 to 359 million tonnes of water. 
 Immediately, two things become evident: PV and wind consume much less water 
and are on average less efficient at generating electricity than natural gas or coal. 
However, the trade-off is worth it: at their largest gaps (that is, PV + wind operating at 
                                                          
90 7 Years Into Exile: How urban Syrian refugees, vulnerable Jordanians and other refugees in Jordan are 
being impacted by the Syria crisis, CARE International, 2017, 74-75. 
91 Francis, 12.  
92 CARE International, 74-75. 
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their lowest estimated capacity and natural gas and coal operating at their highest 
estimate capacities), natural gas will consume 118.45 times more water than PV + wind 
combined, but only produce 5.11 times more electricity. Coal will consume 100.57 times 
more water than the renewable mix and produce 4.34 times more electricity.  
This is a difference that Jordan, which is depleting its water resources at a rapid 
rate, cannot take lightly. In northern governorates with high numbers of Syrian refugees 
both in camps and assimilated into host communities, Jordanians and Syrians alike are 
suffering from extreme water shortages, consuming less than half of the recommended 
minimum daily water intake to meet basic needs. CARE International’s 2017 study found 
that 57 percent of Jordanian residents in Irbid and 49 percent in Mafraq felt that Syrian 
refugees hindered their ability to find clean drinking water.94 Additionally, only one in 
three assimilated Syrian refugees had access to water every day of the month,95 though 
this is likely due to their inability to afford it rather than absolute scarcity. Nevertheless, 
consistent inadequate water consumption can lead to detrimental health effects, such as 
intestinal diseases and dementia.  
Though the two are not necessarily directly linked to each other (i.e. switching 
from gas to PV will not immediately grant the other two-thirds of refugees water every 
day), any savings in water is significant for the Hashemite Kingdom. Over time, it can 
alleviate water shortages and increase supply, making tap and potable water more 
affordable and available as a whole. 
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Additionally, despite the unbalanced water savings to electricity generation ratio, 
it is still more financially viable to utilize PV and wind over natural gas and coal. PV and 
wind are less efficient in generating electricity and therefore require more installed MW. 
Though PV and wind tend to have much higher up-front costs in manufacturing and 
planning, generating electricity costs less than half of its non-renewable rivals. According 
to the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Hala Zawati, “a kilowatt of solar energy 
costs about four cents, which is less than half the cost of oil derivatives, and this is 
steadily decreasing.”96 
Other impacts 
 There are, of course, many other potential positive impacts that renewable energy 
can have on the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan that were not analyzed in detail here. 
Some can make direct impacts on the economy, while others have more intangible, long-
term effects. For example, the CARE International study also revealed that rent and 
electricity constitute 39 percent of the average Jordanian’s monthly expenditure,97 and 
many are struggling to afford electricity at previous rates of consumption98 because of 
higher prices caused by increased demand and population growth. The switch to PV and 
wind can reduce the costs of generating electricity and thus allow residents to consume 
more electricity and live more comfortably.  
 The significant reduction in CO2 emissions could mean cleaner air for the 
Kingdom, which suffers from sub-par air quality. The disdain for refugees due to their 
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strain on state infrastructure and daily Jordanian life can be alleviated, improving 
relationships between the two groups and overall feelings of safety and content. Reduced 
electricity costs can allow schools to better utilize their resources, streetlights to operate 
at all hours of the night, and businesses and safe spaces to stay open longer. For example, 
for many people, the mosque or masjid is a safe place to pray, congregate, and briefly 
alleviate stress. By October 2018, nearly all of the country’s 6000+ mosques were 
operating completely on solar energy.99 One particular mosque in Zarqa is completely run 
on solar energy and provides many services for the estranged and impoverished that the 
state is now unable to do: it houses prayer halls, medical clinics, a pharmacy, a library, 
classrooms and computer labs, an emergency room, and even a small operating room.100 
The initial fundraising for the mosque was a grassroots community effort, and now the 
mosque is undoubtedly saving thousands of dinars in electricity annually and can allocate 
those savings to providing these resources.  
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VIII. Conclusions & Reflections 
 The idea of using renewable energy to mitigate the effects of the Syrian refugee 
crisis in Jordan requires an understanding of the crisis’ complexity, Jordan’s 
infrastructure, and renewable energy’s potential. Jordan has struggled with a rapid 
population growth rate, high unemployment, and water scarcity; since the influx of nearly 
2.5 million Syrian refugees, these problems have only gotten worse. However, there is 
hope in using an unexpected resource as a solution: renewable energy. 
 Though renewable energy is typically considered a solution for energy cost 
savings and environmental protection, this thesis has evaluated the potential of RE as a 
crisis and humanitarian response. Located in the global sunbelt and on hilly terrain, the 
Hashemite Kingdom is a goldmine for wind and solar PV energy. In addition to being 
physically fit for RE, the Government of Jordan has taken many steps to promote the 
development of its renewable sector with years’ worth of rhetoric, the passage of Law 13 
to incentivize renewable investment, and the signing of the Jordan Compact and the 
Jordan Response Plan to put plans for RE into motion.  
 Thus far, progress on implementing renewable solutions has been slow. This is 
largely due to the expensive capital costs of green energy and complicated investment 
processes. However, Jordan is building its renewable sector little-by-little, and even set a 
new global benchmark for the use of RE as a crisis response in Za’atari. 
45 
 
In mid-2017, using funds from the German government, Jordan transformed the 
largest Syrian refugee camp in the world into a sustainable energy model. Za’atari now 
provides electricity for 14 hours a day, up from just eight. Camp residents have begun to 
benefit from the extra light hours a day, from feeling safer at night thanks to lit 
streetlights to the ability to charge their cellphones more frequently and keeping their 
shops open all day. On the logistics side, the UNHCR is enjoying an immediate savings 
of $5M USD annually in electricity generation costs, which can now be delegated to 
providing other services or camp improvements. This impactful change can serve as a 
model for other refugee camps worldwide, especially since refugees and IDPs are 
remaining displaced from their homes for longer lengths of time now more than ever. 
 Renewable energy, specifically solar PV and wind, has tremendous benefits for 
both the environment and the economy. Generating electricity from solar and wind 
energy costs less than half the price of oil derivatives. If Jordan completes 14 of its 
largest wind and solar plant projects, it can potentially create up to 8,300 new jobs just in 
building the energy plants. Another 10,700 jobs will arise from the private sector, as they 
hire experts and laborers to install solar panels and other energy-efficient devices and 
appliances in their own facilities. Diversifying the economy, lowering household costs, 
and providing new job opportunities is imperative for Jordan, as unemployment and 
animosity towards Syrians has only grown since the refugee crisis began.  
 PV and wind also consume considerably less water in the generation of electricity 
compared to traditional fossil fuels. The water savings can reverberate over time to help 
alleviate the extreme water scarcity that again has worsened since the SRC made its way 
to Jordan. Because renewables emit far fewer CO2 emissions, they can help the 
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environment by improving air quality over time, creating a healthier and cleaner 
atmosphere for citizens. Other potential, less-direct impacts include increased access to 
education and improved general livelihoods.  
 As with any study, this thesis has its shortcomings. The projections made on job 
creation and water conservation were generic, using broad ranges of estimates that were 
not specific to Jordan’s capacity or efficiency. Very little data exists on Jordan’s solar PV 
and wind efficiency rates and actual job production because the energy plants are 
relatively new and few in number. Had the data been available, I would have liked to 
compare current water consumption in generating electricity to the potential alternatives 
(i.e. calculating the water savings should Jordan replace all electricity generated by 
natural gas to electricity generated by wind power).  
Additionally, the analysis of solar’s impact on Za’atari is limited because the 
plant was only recently constructed and implemented. Perhaps in a few years, more in-
depth data will become available on the specific changes observed in Za’atari due to RE. 
Future studies can use this thesis as a foundational beginning for research on the 
relationship between renewables and refugee camps and their impacts on livelihood and 
the political rhetoric of the permanent-ization of refugee camps. 
 Overall, renewable energy can play a positive role in dealing with the Syrian 
refugee crisis in Jordan. It has the potential to create jobs (combating unemployment), 
mitigate water waste (combating resource scarcity), reduce household electricity costs 
(combating inflation due to population growth), and improve some aspects of day-to-day 
life (combating animosity). Jordan has and should continue to develop its renewable 
sector and reap the many benefits that come along with it.  
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Appendix 
Table 12: Population and Electricity Consumption in Jordan, 2009-2018101 
 
                                                          
101 (1) H.K.J. Department of Statistics, General Population and Housing Census 2015, 2015, http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/Census2015_Eng.pdf; (2) H.K.J. Department of Statistics, Jordan in Figures 2017 [Arabic], 2017, 
http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/DataBank/JordanInFigures/JORINFIGDetails2017.pdf; (3) H.K.J. Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Annual Report [Arabic], 
2017, http://www.memr.gov.jo/echobusv3.0/SystemAssets/41cb4434-ce69-4eec-822d-df2802eed6bc.pdf; (4) H.K.J. Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, 
Distribution of Electricity Consumption by Sector [Arabic], 2017, http://www.memr.gov.jo/echobusv3.0/SystemAssets/0a6a427a-6969-4e0b-80b6-
68a96a8221f5.pdf; (5) “Syrian Regional Refugee Response,” UNHCR, 2018, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36. 
